China’s mediation in Myanmar’s civil wars indicates a change to China’s foreign policy away from a stated policy of ‘non-interference’ to one involving mediation and conflict management to protect its national interests.
Key words: China, Myanmar, foreign policy, conflict transformation, economic interests
In recent decades, China has emerged as an active mediator in peacemaking in Myanmar. Historically, China has refrained from conducting mediation and peacebuilding in other nations, according to its ‘non-interference’ foreign policy principle. However, as multiple conflicts increasingly pose threats to China’s economic and security interests, it has played a growing role in conflict management in conflict-affected states such as Myanmar.
China’s conflict management includes economic development, political mediation and humanitarian assistance. It aims to prevent and manage conflicts while protecting its national interests.
Here, I focus on its mediation role. The stated underlying principles of China’s mediation are respect for state sovereignty, economic development, and seeking political resolution through dialogue and consultation. China’s mediation primarily seeks to manage conflict through reducing violence, facilitating dialogue, and maintaining stability.
China-Myanmar relations
Myanmar has a long history of direct military rule that is intertwined with multiple and protracted armed conflicts. Various Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs), including those along the Chinese border in Kachin and Shan states (such as the Kachin Independence Organisation, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army) have long engaged in decades of armed conflict with the Myanmar military.
As a result, maintaining stability in Myanmar has been a central objective of China’s foreign policy on Myanmar. A critical aim is to maintain stability along the border because Myanmar’s ethnic conflicts result in refugees entering China, disruptions to border trade and infrastructure investment, and threats to the safety of Chinese citizens. Additionally, China perceives Myanmar as a strategic corridor to Southeast Asia, South Asia, and the Indian Ocean. In this sense, China’s strategic appraisal of Myanmar has been shaped by the context of growing Sino-US competition in Southeast Asia. China has advanced large-scale infrastructure projects in Myanmar to enhance its connectivity, secure energy security, and promote regional influence. Furthermore, Myanmar also offers China’s landlocked Yunnan and other provinces enormous opportunities to expand its economic presence overseas through infrastructure, trade, and investment. Consequently, stability in Myanmar’s borderlands is closely linked to China’s broader objectives of its own border stability, energy security, economic development, and geopolitical influence.
China engages with Myanmar’s national governments as they are the primary counterpart for managing bilateral relations, border governance, and economic cooperation. The bilateral relationship has evolved considerably over the years. During the period of military rule prior to 2011, China maintained close diplomatic and economic relations with the military government. Myanmar’s political opening under the Thein Sein government, however, introduced new uncertainties into the relationship and it deteriorated amid growing Western influence and controversies surrounding Chinese investment. Bilateral relations gradually improved under the National League for Democracy (NLD) government (2015-2021) as it sought China’s help with peace summits (known as the 21st Century Panglong Conferences) as well as shielding it from international condemnation over the persecution of the Rohingya community within Myanmar. Following the 2021 military coup, China–Myanmar relations entered a new phase. The rapid deterioration of Myanmar’s security situation and growing threats to Chinese citizens and investments prompted China to exercise greater influence over the Myanmar military in relation to ceasefire negotiations, strengthening border security, and action against online scam centres in Myanmar that target Chinese citizens.
Pursuing foreign policy objectives in Myanmar has required China not only to engage with the Myanmar military government, but also with northern Ethnic Armed Organisations that exercise de facto control over large territories along the China-Myanmar border. This dual-track engagement reflects the reality that the promotion of China’s core interests requires relationships with the Ethnic Armed Organisations as they influence security conditions, border crossings and trade, and infrastructure development in the borderlands.
In what ways is China playing an increasing mediation role in Myanmar?
China has assumed a lead mediating role in Myanmar’s violent conflicts along its borders. This is one of the most prominent examples of China emerging as an active mediator in conflicts of other states. The Myanmar case exemplifies the characteristics of China’s mediation as highly pragmatic, informed by its national interests and oriented toward conflict management rather than conflict resolution. Conflict management focuses on controlling and reducing the negative impact of ongoing conflicts, rather than addressing drivers of the conflict.
It is in the Kachin conflict that China, for the first time, has played a public role in an internal conflict between the central government of another sovereign state and a local rebel group. In 2013, China appointed a special envoy and hosted talks between the Kachin Independence Organisation and the Myanmar government in Ruili, Yunnan Province. In June 2015, China pressured the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army to announce a unilateral ceasefire after the clash between it and the military that killed five Chinese citizens. This was followed in 2016 by China’s more proactive and high-profile role in bringing the National League for Democracy government, the military and northern Ethnic Armed Organisations to the negotiating table to discuss ceasefires during the 21st Century Panglong Conferences held in 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2020.
In February 2021, the military staged a coup, rejected the results of the 2020 general election, and responded with deadly force to the mass protests demanding the restoration of civilian rule and democratic governance. In January 2024, China brokered a ceasefire between the military and the Three Brotherhood Alliance (an Ethnic Armed Organisation) after they launched an offensive known as Operation 1027. China also brokered a ceasefire between the military and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (another Ethnic Armed Organisation) in January 2025 and deployed a team to monitor the ceasefire in April 2025.
Chinese mediation in Myanmar has involved official visits, shuttle diplomacy, and various formal and informal meetings by officials from the central authorities and Yunnan province. Chinese top leaders and officials—for example, President Xi Jinping, Foreign Minister Wang Yi, Special Envoy to Asian Affairs Wang Yingfan, Sun Guoxiang, Deng Xijun, and China’s ambassadors to Myanmar—have engaged in mediation in Myanmar’s ethnic conflicts, both in Myanmar and by hosting peace talks in China/Yunnan.
President Xi has played a significant role in China’s conflict engagement in Myanmar. For instance, his state visit to Myanmar in 2020 demonstrated China’s high-level political support for stability in Myanmar. It also gave Chinese diplomats and special envoys greater room to engage directly in peace negotiations. In addition, Foreign Minister Wang Yi, has frequently engaged with a diversity of stakeholders, including Myanmar authorities and ASEAN states, and coordinated China’s official diplomatic responses to major conflict and political developments in Myanmar, especially when ethnic conflicts undermine China’s border stability. China’s special envoys have frequently conducted shuttle diplomacy between the military, the Myanmar government, and northern Ethnic Armed Organisations to facilitate dialogue and ceasefires.
What tools and strategies does China use in mediating Myanmar’s ethnic conflict?
China’s wide range of tools and strategies to shape the direction and outcomes of Myanmar’s ethnic conflicts combine diplomatic principles, security guarantees, investment opportunities, and trade restrictions, reflecting China’s growing willingness and assertiveness to protect its interests in Myanmar.
Diplomatic principles
The principle of ‘all-inclusiveness’ has underpinned China’s involvement in the Thein Sein government’s nationwide ceasefire agreement, and the 21st Century Panglong Conferences of the National League for Democracy (NLD) government. For China, inclusivity means the participation of major stakeholders, including the Myanmar authorities and major northern Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) in the peace processes.
The principle of all-inclusiveness serves as a tool through which China selectively pressures and aligns with particular parties to the conflict, thereby developing a peace process that suits its interests. For example, Beijing actively supported the inclusion of several EAOs (the Arakan Army, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army) into the peace process of the 21st Century Panglong Conferences; and supported the Myanmar authorities’ preference to have a ceasefire before political dialogue. For China, excluding EAOs risked the collapse of negotiations and renewed violence along the border.
Security guarantees for conflicting parties to attend peace talks in Myanmar
As there is deep distrust between the military and EOAs, Chinese authorities facilitate safe passage, logistics protection, and a safe environment for peace negotiations. For example, in July 2018, China arranged travel for all members of the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (an alliance of seven EAOs) to attend the third Panglong Conference. Guo Bao, Deputy Director of Yunnan Provincial Public Security Department, also attended a meeting in Wa State and personally accompanied members of the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee to attend the Conference.
Economic leverage
Scholars have argued that China possesses significant economic leverage over Myanmar actors, including the military and EOAs. This leverage derives from China’s central role in cross-border trade, investment, and infrastructure projects, enabling China to influence the calculations and behaviours of conflict actors in Myanmar to align with Chinese interests. For example, China reportedly used Chinese projects such as a railway from Muse in northern Shan to Mandalay as economic leverage to persuade the military to accept the participation of the Arakan Army, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army into the 21st Century Panglong Conferences.
Border trade is believed to be another important source of economic leverage for China in mediation. EOAs in northern Myanmar heavily rely on revenue from cross-border trade, electricity, natural resource extraction, and informal economic activity connected to China. Therefore, media reports have suggested that China uses cross-border trade to pressure northern Ethnic Armed Organisations to reduce conflict and participate in peace dialogue by expanding or restricting transportation routes and commercial flows to northern Myanmar. For example, in June 2024 China reportedly closed all its border crossings to territory controlled by the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, after it participated in attacks against the Myanmar military in Shan State. In August of that year, China also reportedly persuaded the United Wa State Army (an EAO) to exercise pressure on other EAOs (the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army and Ta’ang National Liberation Army) to stop their offensive against the military by cutting off access to food, funds, information, and recruits.
Information on China’s mediation is opaque, and many reports are based on anonymous sources rather than independently verifiable documentation. Nevertheless, these accounts are consistent with scholars and experts’ views that China’s economic interconnectedness with Myanmar—including infrastructure investment and border trade—has provided China with economic influence to shape the peace negotiations in Myanmar.
Ceasefire implementation
China’s ceasefire implementation represents a deeper level of conflict engagement, as China not only facilitates peace dialogue, but it also attempts to exercise influence over ceasefire implementation.
According to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in April 2025, China witnessed the handover of Lashio—a strategically important city and the capital of Northern Shan State—to the Myanmar military, following a ceasefire China brokered with the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army. While there is little information available on how the Chinese team monitored the ceasefire, China appears to recognise that ceasefires in Myanmar are highly fragile and there is a need to actively prevent the collapse of ceasefires. It may mark a shift in China’s mediation from simply brokering peace deals toward getting involved in managing post-ceasefire implementation and stability.
This does not necessarily indicate that China is moving towards involvement in comprehensive conflict resolution. China’s mediation approach in Myanmar still prioritises stability, conflict management, and protection of national interests over addressing deeper political grievances and conflict resolution.
The broader trend of China’s conflict management
China’s mediation in Myanmar’s ethnic conflicts not only reflects that China seeks to protect its investments, trade routes, and border stability but also demonstrates broader change to its foreign policy oriented toward playing an active role in mediation, conflict management, and peacemaking in Myanmar and elsewhere.
In July 2024, senior representatives of multiple Palestinian factions, including Hamas and Fatah, signed the Beijing Declaration on Ending Division and Strengthening Palestinian National Unity aimed at recognising the Palestinian Liberation Organisation as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. In March 2023, China brokered an agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran to resume diplomatic relations. This diplomatic breakthrough was built on Iraq and Oman’s efforts to have several rounds of dialogue between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2021 and 2022. China also appointed Xue Bing as the Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa Affairs to mediate the conflicts in the Horn of Africa. As these cases and China’s 2022 Global Security Initiative (its vision for the international security order) have shown, China has recently played a much more robust role in promoting the political settlement of international and regional conflict.
China’s behaviour in Myanmar has become one of the clearest examples of this transition. As China’s foreign interests continue to expand, Myanmar may therefore be a revealing example of a broader Chinese approach to conflict management in which mediation becomes a foreign policy tool not only to promote security and economic interests, but also for advancing geopolitical influence and regional order-building.
Image: Ruili Port on the China-Myanmar border. Credit: 瑞丽江的河水/WikiCommons.
