Indonesia was founded as a multi-religious nation-state with no state religion, despite having a predominantly Sunni Muslim population. Its Constitution recognises religious diversity and guarantees, in law, the right to worship for all its citizens. However, the reality presents a more complicated picture. While there is official recognition and support for certain religions, religious minorities and adherents of ‘unrecognised religions’ often face social and legal restriction, discrimination and repression.
A significant ongoing concern is Indonesia’s Blasphemy Law, introduced in the 1960s and still actively enforced, which criminalises defamation or insults against ‘recognised religions’. Despite several legal challenges in recent years, the law remains in effect and is often used to target minority religious groups or individuals. In early 2025, the Catholic Church in Flores accused an opponent of a Church-linked palm plantation of blasphemy; in late 2024 a transgender Muslim woman in Medan was accused of blasphemy against Christianty, and in March 2023 a Muslim social media figure was reported to police for blasphemy after she videoed herself eating pork.
In some cases, the use of this law is also strongly imbued with political interests and motives. One prominent example was the highly politicised blasphemy charges against Basuki Tjahaya Purnama, commonly known as Ahok, a rising Christian-Chinese political figure during the Jakarta gubernatorial election in 2017.
Against this backdrop, I revisit the ongoing struggles over the rights of religious minorities in post-New Order Indonesia, characterised by competing trends of democratisation and the conservative turn in Indonesian Islam. Focusing on the debates revolving around the Blasphemy Law, I specifically explore the extent to which the liberal discourse of religious freedom and minority rights can be reconciled with Islamic theology and state ideology in Indonesia. I argue that the rights of religious minorities remain a significant source of contention, marked by competing and polarised Muslim voices.
The Blasphemy Law and the rise of religious majoritarianism
One of the key factors contributing to ongoing cases of intolerance against religious minorities in Indonesia is a strong tendency within its bureaucracy and judiciary to maintain a majoritarian social order. This inclination is deeply embedded in the Indonesian state system, which reflects broad community support for government policies that favor the mainstream religions: Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Confucianism. But smaller minority sects, such as the Ahmadiyah and Shi’a, suffer as a result.
Religious majoritarian tendencies are well-entrenched within Indonesia’s political and legal systems through, among others, the introduction of the Blasphemy Law (No. 1/PNPS/1965) in the 1960s. The Blasphemy Law prohibits publicly interpreting a religion or conducting religious activities that deviate from the core tenets of the religions adhered to by people in Indonesia. It contains an article imposing a five-year prison sentence for intentionally expressing public views or engaging in actions that ‘in principle incite hostilities considered as abuse or defamation of a religion embraced in Indonesia; or has the intention that a person should not practice any religion at all that is based on Belief in Almighty God’. The law specifically mentions Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Buddhism, Hinduism and Confucianism as ‘recognised religions’. While it also states that other religions such as Judaism, Zoroastrianism, Shintoism and Taoism are not prohibited, it implies that these religions, and particularly various local religions and beliefs, are not afforded the same level of protection and support from the state.
Followers of religions or beliefs outside the six recognised religions are often labeled as ‘people who do not yet have a religion’, members of splinter religions or a potential threat to public and political order. All these labels have made adherents of non-mainstream religions highly vulnerable to enforced conversion to mainstream religions or the imposition of ‘purification’ agendas by religious establishments. In practice, the law has also led to discrimination against religious minorities in terms of their civil and administrative rights. For example, many individuals from minority religions are forced to identify as members of a different religion to obtain an identity card. Furthermore, many couples are required to marry according to one of the officially recognised religions, even if that does not align with their own faith.
Failed judicial attempts to challenge the Blasphemy Law
The application of the Blasphemy Law is often a violation of religious freedom and minority rights in Indonesia, and it has been subject to several challenges in the Constitutional Court. In 2009, the first petition for judicial review of the Blasphemy Law was officially filed in the Constitutional Court by the Religious Freedom Advocacy Team. The team was a coalition of several human rights lawyers representing seven human rights Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) and four individuals as formal applicants, including prominent Muslim intellectuals and activists such as former President Abdurrahman Wahid, Siti Musdah Mulia, and M. Dawam Rahardjo, widely known for their liberal and progressive religious views and sustained struggle for minority rights.
The Religious Freedom Advocacy Team argued that the law:
- Allows too much room for state involvement and intervention in religious matters.
- Fails to provide an inclusive and equal guarantee of religious freedom by granting freedom only to certain religions and religious understandings and discriminating against others.
- Tends to blur the distinction between religious interpretation and the defamation of religion. For many progressive Muslims in particular, the two should be clearly distinguished, stressing that religion has been historically subjected to multiple interpretations even on fundamental religious issues.
The Constitutional Court, however, rejected the petition, maintaining that the law should remain in effect to protect public order. The Court supported the concerns expressed by many Islamic leaders and government officials, arguing that revoking the law would result in social unrest and anarchy within the community. It justified the law based on ‘religious values,’ which are recognised by the Indonesian Constitution but not by international human rights law. Emphasising the unique and historically close relationship between the state and religion in Indonesia, the Court viewed the law as a compromise between the state and religious leaders. This compromise allows the state to restrict religious activities based on ‘public order’ or ‘religious values,’ while also granting some authority to religious leaders to act as gatekeepers in defining the ‘correct’ interpretation of their religion.
Progressive Muslim intellectuals and activists were very disappointed with the Court’s decision, arguing that the Court had legitimised the state’s discriminatory treatment of followers of local beliefs and minority sects. They were also concerned that the decision would empower violent and intolerant groups and legitimise violent acts against those they deem deviant. For them, the Constitutional Court had sided with the reasoning of intolerant groups and considered violent reactions to deviant interpretations as normal.
Importantly, progressive Muslim groups considered that the Court’s perspective and interpretation of the 1945 Constitution and human rights was strongly influenced by the political and ideological aspiration of the status quo group who advocated for an ‘integralistic relationship’ between the government and its citizens. The Court’s decision was also viewed as affirming the prevailing discourse of ‘interfaith harmony’ (kerukunan umat beragama), which emphasises the absence of conflict. This discursive framework tends to allow the government to intervene and ban minority groups deemed deviant from mainstream religious interpretations, as they are seen as provoking anger and violence—thereby disrupting harmony among the majority. In contrast, progressive Muslim groups, along with the wider circle of human rights activists, use and promote the phrase ‘freedom of religion or belief’ (kebebasan beragama dan berkeyakinan), which is more in line with international human rights discourse and standards. This phrase stresses the importance of guaranteeing and protecting the religious rights of all individuals against intervention from other individuals, the majority, or the government. The Court’s decision was thus viewed by progressive Muslims as reflecting a conservative and narrow interpretation of religious freedom. This is seen as unfortunate, especially considering the significant strides made in strengthening the constitutional framework and guaranteeing human rights since the fall of the authoritarian regime of the New Order. While progressive Muslims perceive the amended constitution as relatively liberal and broadly supportive of international human rights standards, the Constitutional Court seemed to adopt a more conservative and majoritarian view of human rights, religious freedom and the rights of religious minorities.
In 2012, a group of lawyers of the Universalia Legal Aid Institute, in collaboration with the Indonesian Association of Ahl al-Bayt, filed the second petition for judicial review of the Blasphemy Law by the Constitutional Court. This action was prompted by brutal attacks on the Shiite community, led by followers of Shia cleric Tajul Muluk, in Sampang Madura, where a dozen people were killed and hundreds of Shiites were driven from their homes. The Indonesian Ulema Council of East Java issued a fatwa justifying these attacks, claiming that Shiite teachings, particularly those of Twelver Shi’ism (Imamiyah Ithna Ash’ariyah), were misguided and misleading. The petitioners argued that, despite the Court’s complete rejection of their initial petition during the first judicial review in 2010, the Blasphemy Law remained constitutionally problematic due to the lack of clear guidelines for interpretation.
One of the expert witnesses in the second judicial review, Noorhaidi Hasan, a professor of Islamic Studies at the State Islamic University of Sunan Kalijaga in Yogyakarta, questioned the authority of the Indonesian Ulema Council to declare whether a religious belief or sect is heretical or theologically misleading. Hasan argued that, according to Islamic tradition, such judgments are beyond the authority of muftis, whose role is limited to addressing legal issues. Consequently, individuals who hold certain theological beliefs will face theological consequences rather than legal ones. Ultimately, the authority to impose such consequences does not belong to rulers or theologians, but solely to God. Despite this compelling argument, the Court reaffirmed its previous decision to reject the revocation of the law.
Competing visions on the Indonesian state and religious freedom
The debates surrounding the Blasphemy Law highlight the ongoing struggle over the relationship between religion and the state and the normative framework of religious freedom in post-New Order Indonesia. These debates illustrate how the dynamic relations between religion and the state are being redefined. They also reflect the differing normative perspectives on religious diversity within the context of Indonesian nation-building. These debates thus serve as a conceptual ‘battlefield’ where the struggle to establish the legitimate religious-political language of post-New Order Indonesian society takes place.
In the ongoing debates regarding religion-state relations and religious freedom in Indonesia, the inclusive pluralist perspective advocated by progressive Muslim intellectuals has largely been overlooked. Meanwhile, state officials and the Constitutional Court appear to favor a highly restrictive and particularistic approach to these issues. These evolving debates highlight in particular the clash between the civic-inclusive vision of statehood and religious freedom—advocated by progressive Muslim groups, along with other pro-democracy and human rights groups—and the majoritarian tendencies, widely supported by conservative-radical Islamic groups as well as some elements of the mainstream Islamic establishment. Majoritarian tendencies seem to be increasingly incorporated into the state’s official ideological and constitutional discourse.
It is worth recalling a well-known statement by Mukti Ali, a Minister of Religious Affairs during the New Order. He described the nature of the Indonesian state, asserting that Indonesia has chosen its own path; it is neither a theocratic state nor a secular one. Instead, it is based on belief in God, and has established operational principles for the development of religion, aimed at Mukti Ali’s interpretation of the nature of the Indonesian state has become the prevailing perspective in Indonesian constitutional and political discourse over the past few decades. This interpretation appears to have influenced the reasoning of the Constitutional Court in its decision regarding the Blasphemy Law. For the judges of the Constitutional Court, Article 29(1) of the 1945 Constitution serves as the foundation of the principle of the rule of law (negara hukum), which they define as ‘a rule-based state that prioritises belief in One God as a fundamental principle.’ With this fundamental principle, the 1945 Constitution is broadly interpreted to mean that it does not allow for the promotion of a freedom to not follow a religion, the advocacy of anti-religious beliefs, or the denigration of religious teachings, scriptures, or the name of God. Consequently, there is a growing consensus that the protection of religious freedom must also involve safeguarding the purity of religious teachings. This implies that the state’s responsibility extends beyond merely protecting religious communities; it also includes the duty to preserve the purity of their teachings from any misuse or deviation.
The Constitutional Court’s interpretation seems to neglect the inclusive and progressive vision of Haji Agus Salim, one of Indonesia’s founding fathers and a highly respected Muslim intellectual and leader. Salim argued that the first principle of Pancasila (Indonesia’s foundational principles, contained in the preamble to the Constituion) should not be used to undermine the rights and freedoms of atheists or polytheists, as it upholds ‘absolute freedom of religion or belief. As he asserted:
‘can we—with this state principle (‘belief in One God’) acknowledge the freedom of the atheists or the polytheists? Of course, we can! [This is] because our constitution, like the constitutions of every civilized state, recognizes and guarantees the freedom of religion, only with the limitation mentioned, that is, they do not breach public morality, public order and peace.
It seems clear, however, that following the Constitutional Court’s decision on the Blasphemy Law, Salim’s inclusive and progressive view on this matter is increasingly marginalised in official constitutional and legal discourse. Further, the idea that the state has an obligation to interfere in the religious sphere seems to be firmly incorporated into official constitutional discourse.
Concluding remarks
The preceding analysis on the debates on religious freedom and minority rights in Indonesia suggests that these evolving debates not only reflect the changing dynamics of post-New Order Muslim politics but also point to a deeper ideological challenge: the continuing ambiguity of Indonesia’s political-legal framework of religion-state relations.
The Constitutional Court’s landmark ruling on the Blasphemy Law, which reaffirms Pancasila as ‘the middle path’ but offers no clear attempt to address its ambiguity, effectively opens the door for state involvement in maintaining religious orthodoxy, contributing to the rise of religious majoritarianism.
It is this inherent ambiguity that makes the inclusive and pluralist discourse on minority rights highly contentious in contemporary Indonesia. The Indonesian case illustrates that the contested boundaries between religious and political authorities, coupled with socially rooted and officially endorsed religious majoritarianism, serve as significant obstacles to establishing an inclusive, albeit not exclusively liberal, framework for governing religious diversity through which the religious rights of all citizens, including those belonging to minority groups, are equally respected and guaranteed.
Main image: A man praying at Jakarta Cathedral. Credit: Black_Claw/Flickr.
