This article examines cultural extremism against Copts in Egypt, focusing on the recurring patterns of attacks on churches.
Copts are Egyptian Orthodox Christians who identify themselves as one of the earliest sects of Christianity in the world. They comprise around 10-15 percent of the nation’s population. Copts have never had any territorial or political ambitions that jeopardised the stability of the nation, and they have lived alongside Muslims, Jews, and other Christians in Egypt for centuries, until Egyptian culture was altered and polarised over the last 55 years.
Previous academic research and analysis has focused on the relationship between the state and Copts. I seek to investigate the cultural patterns that justify hatred and discrimination against Copts and highlight a covert aspect of extremism by observing and analysing cultural and structural violence.
How cultural and structural violence causes direct violence
Johan Galtung is a leading scholar who coined the concept of cultural violence, providing a comprehensive model to understand the triggers of violence. He identifies three major components: direct violence (physical), cultural violence and structural violence.
In his definition, cultural violence is ‘any aspect of a culture that can be used to legitimise violence in its direct or structural form.’ As an example, radical Islamists reject ‘a man-made secular political system’ by refusing to participate in that state’s secular institutions. Some Islamist groups and institutions seek to Islamise society using a quietist approach by drip-feeding the culture and immersing society in ultra-conservative values.
For Gultung, structural violence is ‘the sum total of all the clashes built into the social and world structures and cemented, solidified so that unjust, inequitable outcomes are almost unchangeable’.
Importantly, Galtung regards cultural and structural violence as invisible, as opposed to direct violence, which is visible. He states:
‘The visible effects of direct violence are[known]: the killed, the wounded, the displaced, the material damage, all increasingly hitting the civilians. But the invisible effects may be even more vicious: direct violence reinforces structural and cultural violence’.
He further argues that a culture of violence and a repressive or exploitative system are the major triggers for direct violence. Cultural violence against Copts is invisible until it leads to direct, physical violence.
In her 2013 study, Copts at the Crossroads, Professor of politics Mariz Tadros recorded 180 sectarian incidents from 2008 to 2011. This figure increased significantly after the Arab Spring and the removal of the Muslim Brotherhood regime. For example, in the governate of Minya alone, there were 77 sectarian attacks from 2011 to 2016. Such repetitive acts of violence demonstrate the deep-rooted cultural hatred against Copts, particularly in Upper Egypt, where the majority of Muslims perceive the ‘other’ as a threat to their identity.
The physical act of attacking Copts is alarming, but the covert extremism or invisible cultural violence that triggers these acts is more dangerous in the long term, according to Galtung’s theory. Taking the frequent pattern of attacking Churches in Egypt as a case study, this article dives deeper to understand the cultural dynamics between Muslims and Copts.
The implications of an increasingly Islamised Egypt
With the removal of the Egyptian monarchy in 1952, Gamal Abdel Nasser (r 1954-1970) led a secular initiative that focused on Arab unity regardless of religion or belief. Although he partially succeeded in exporting his project of Arab nationalism across the Middle East, he faced two major challenges. Locally, an internal and well-organised competitor, the Muslim Brotherhood, endangered the durability of his regime. Regionally, the growing influence of Saudi Arabia threatened to thwart Arab nationalism by promoting Wahhabism, a strict form of Sunni Islam.
The Muslim Brotherhood is considered to be the mother movement of political Islamist groups. It was founded in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna in Egypt as a social and religious movement. Its declared aim was to oppose British colonialism and raise religious awareness at the grassroots level. After Egypt’s independence, its ideology became more pronounced. The Brotherhood viewed religion as ‘the solution to the political problems facing Muslims [that] lay in the setting up of an Islamic State.’ Henceforth, their agenda of Islamising the community clashed with Nasser’s strategy of secularising and nationalising the state, which led to violent confrontations during the 1950s and 1960s.
After Egypt’s defeat in the Six-Day War in 1967 against Israel (Naksa, setback), Nasser’s Arab nationalism project had been thwarted, leading Islamism to gradually dominate the Middle East. The 1967 defeat led the Arab world to question the value of Arab nationalism, and ‘it was widely asserted that the defeat was a punishment of the Arabs for straying from the path of true Islam.’ This notion was promoted later by Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabism.
In contrast to the Arab nationalism project, former Egyptian president Anwar Sadat (r 1970-1981) implemented an infitah (open door policy) in which he liberalised the political arena and eased restrictions on political Islamist groups. Under his rule, the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups were politically active. For example, radical Islamist groups dominated student elections at public universities between 1975 and 1979, and they were allowed to propagate their ideology and contribute significantly to shaping Egyptian culture among young generations.
Through Sadat’s infitah, Islamists gained political control over local culture. Sadat aimed to maintain a balance by empowering religious-oriented actors to counterweight Nasserist socialist opposition, which included influential young movements. In parallel to the infitah policy, Saudi Arabia’s growing financial power since 1973 facilitated the expansion of Wahhabism. Political scientist Gilles Kepel argues that in the 1970s, ‘the balance between these two competing ideologies—Arab nationalism versus Islamism— had shifted, and the Islamist movement had become a potent mobilising force in Egypt and elsewhere.’ Saudi Wahhabism and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood were active in shaping the socio-political scene in the region, consolidating the Islamist identity of the nation, perceiving the ‘other, including Copts, as a threat.
To exert their influence, Saudi Arabia poured petroleum dollars into other countries. It offered job opportunities to Egyptians and Arabs who moved into the Kingdom and were influenced by the country’s culture and traditions. On their return, Egyptian expats brought these influences with them, affecting a large portion of society. Extremist Islamist groups, such as Jama’at al-Jihad and al-Jama’a al-Islamiyyia, practiced hesba punishing those whom they considered to be violating the fundamentals of Islam, such as unveiled women, Coptic Christians, and liberal Muslim thinkers, leading Egypt to endure long waves of terror attacks in the 1980s and 1990s.
Decades later, Egypt marked ‘the deadliest and most complex insurgency in its [Egypt’s] modern history’ after the removal of President Mohamed Morsi by the military in July 2013. Copts were among the major victims of terrorism. Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that at least 42 churches were attacked, burned, or damaged in 2013, as well as dozens of other Christian religious institutions across Egypt. Coptic Bishop General of Minya, Anba Makarios, told HRW that he heard ‘local mosque preachers inciting sectarian attacks,’ and that ‘Islam is in danger, [and] the infidels will eradicate Islam.’ Such views are consistent with radical ideology promoted by sheikhs such as Ahmed al-Naquib, Yasser al-Borhami, Mohamed Hassan Yaqoub, and many others. For instance, in one of his sermons in 2013, al-Naquib said: ‘Churches should not be allowed to be built in Islamic nations [Diyar al-Islam],’ and warned attendees that ‘there is a plot against Islam’.
Cultural and structural violence against Copts: Church construction as a case study
The ongoing controversy over church construction in Egypt further demonstrates cultural dynamics and is an important indicator of understanding hatred against Copts.
Church construction is allowed by Egypt’s 2014 Constitution, which emphasises that ‘freedom of belief is absolute’ and ‘the freedom of practicing religious rituals and establishing places of worship for the followers of ‘divine religions’ is a right regulated by law.’ Moreover, in 2016, the parliament approved the Church Construction Law, which delegates the power to issue permits for building or renovating churches to governors instead of the country’s president. The law was expected to expedite the process of issuing permits for church construction.
The 2016 law also includes provisions that legalise existing unlicensed Churches. During former President Muhamed Hosni Mubarak’s era (r 1981- 2011), the regulation of Church construction was managed entirely by the State Security Investigation (SSI) apparatus. According to Egyptian Judge Noha al-Zeini, the standard practice was for Copts to seek an application for the construction of a Church and SSI to deny an official permit, but grant an informal approval to convert a building into an unlicensed Church. As a result, many unlicensed Churches were denied an official permit, but SSI allowed them to function for decades. The reason, according to Tadros, was that the security apparatus under Mubarak’s regime sought to exert influence over the Coptic community.
In 2022, President Sisi’s government issued a decision to legalise the status of 141 churches that have been allowed to function for decades by security apparatuses without an official permit. The decision reflects the government’s endeavors to support Copts by legalising 2, 9730 out of 3, 3730 unlicensed Churches.
However, despite this, and despite Sisi’s eagerness to show support for Copts and his repeated calls to reform religious rhetoric, Copts continue to struggle to build their places of worship due to slow bureaucratic processes and opposition from Muslims, especially in villages and rural areas, whose residents perceive church construction as a threat to the nation’s Islamic identity.
A recent example occurred on April 23, 2024, at Al-Fawakher in Minya, when Muslim villagers attacked Copts and set their houses on fire ahead of the Coptic Orthodox Easter celebrations. The attack was triggered by the intention to legalise a church in the village. Human rights organisation, Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, has recorded 32 ‘sectarian violence’ incidents across nine governorates associated with the practice of Copts’ religious rites since the passage of the 2016 Church construction law.
A particularly serious example occurred on June 30, 2016, when Muslim villagers of Koum al-Loufi in Samalout/Minya attacked Coptic citizens over a suspicion that they were building a Church. Bishop Anba Pavontius of Samalout reportedly stated that officials were hesitant to issue a permit to build a Church in the village, and police were needed ‘to persuade the Muslim villagers’ to accept the opening of a Church. The Muslim villagers regarded Koum al-Loufi as a Muslim village that should not include a Church because it would lead to sectarian tension.
The violence at Koum al-Loufi was not an isolated incident but part of a recurring pattern, especially in Upper Egypt, where the population of radical Islamists is concentrates and Copts also make up a significant portion of the population.
Strikingly, these sectarian incidents were not instigated by radical Islamist militant groups, but by ordinary people. The influence of Wahhabism plays a significant role in shaping community mindset. Most critically, this set of beliefs and thoughts constitutes a radical ideology that is being used to create fear of the ‘other’ and justify attacking them. This emphasises the gravity of Galtung’s concept of cultural violence. Cultural violence operates at a less visible level that is embedded in collective narratives, religious traditions, cultural norms, and identity politics that position other faith communities as alien and as an ‘out’ group. In his definition of extremism, academic and journalist J.M. Berger dives deeper to explain the mechanism that an in-group perceives as necessary for their survival: the need for hostile action against an out-group.. He adds, ‘Hostile acts can range from verbal attacks and diminishment to discriminatory behavior, violence, and even genocide.’ In other words, covert extremism is highly likely to be a trigger and/or justification of direct violence.
Restrictions on Church construction in Egypt, whether through permit denials or vandalism, can be interpreted not merely as bureaucratic or legislative dilemmas but as manifestations of a broader socio-cultural system. The in-group believes that hostile actions are necessary to protect the symbolic dominance of their faith and local identity. Sociologist Pierre Bourdieu explains this further through his concept of symbolic violence, which is an understanding of how dominant cultural and religious groups enforce restrictions and perpetuate exclusion.
In the Egyptian case, subsequent governments over recent past decades have refused to acknowledge the existence of cultural violence against Copts, fearing this might jeopardise the nation’s national security and stability. Accordingly, they have failed to enforce decisive and effective enforcement measures to protect the Copts from hostility; relying on informal customary reconciliation sessions [Jaslat al-Sulh] instead. These reconciliation committees include religious leaders of the two communities, clerics and priests, and security figures. They can resolve disputes temporarily but do not address the deep-rooted issues and the absence of effective laws.
Conclusion
Covert extremism against Copts hinders governmental-structural reforms to maintain equality between Muslims and Copts.
The relationship between Muslims and Copts has been impacted by Egypt’s socio-political context, which has shifted dramatically since the 1970s when political Islamist groups began playing a very active role in shaping Egyptian culture. While Egyptian Muslims and Copts should not be understood in simple terms as radical versus liberal, Egyptian culture has become more polarised and less tolerant.
There is an absence of a genuine and realistic strategy to address the ongoing direct and cultural violence against Copts, which jeopardises not only the safety of Copts but also that of the entire society. The Egyptian government’s policies in support of Copts are insufficient to counter sectarian violence, and covert extremism against Copts hinders governmental-structural reforms.
I suggest a set of policies to counter cultural extremism, in particular, in villages and other rural areas. Inspired by a whole-of-society approach, governmental institutions, progressive religious leaders, and other societal actors should be actively and genuinely involved in correcting deep-rooted misconceptions and promoting pluralism and religious diversity. At the state level, Ministries of Education, Information, and Religious Endowments (Awqaf) should orchestrate a systematic campaign to promote constructive cultural values through education, media and religious channels. Moderate and progressive clerics should be empowered to promote the moderate teachings of Islam in state TV channels, online forums, and in sermons. Sectarian disputes should be resolved through legal channels rather than customary reconciliation committees. Finally, human rights activists and liberal Muslims should lead initiatives to raise awareness and educate the public and counter the mainstream extremism against the Copts.
Image: People inside a Coptic Church in Cairo. Credit: askii/Flickr.
