Anthony J. Spires traces the history of the relationship between global civil society and China by analyzing the normative impacts it had on the Chinese state and domestic civil society. His view is that the core of this challenging relationship is the claim of “universal values” used by global civil society underpinned by principles of human rights and democracy that have gained ground in China despite government resistance. However, while the Chinese party-state wants to benefit from engagement with global civil society, leaders in Beijing have also determined to minimize any impact from outside groups.
The book (a concise 86 pages and classified as an ‘Element’ by the publisher Cambridge University Press) has three main sections: global civil society as a normative and political project; impacts of global civil society on China; and the State-led internationalization of Chinese government-organized NGOs (GONGOs). Spires concludes with observations about future research directions, including the internationalization of Chinese civil society through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
The concept of a “global civil society” relies on Professor of Politics John Keane’s description of non-state organizations that have emerged as part of a post-Cold War vision of an increasingly democratic world. China’s troubled relationship with global civil society has evolved over the past several decades and Spires argues that it remains unstable because the international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) that comprise global civil society have created core missions devoted to universal values of human rights and democratic participation.
Chinese NGOs and GONGOs were originally encouraged by the government to join global civil society mostly as a way to get resources for development, but after revolutions in former Communist countries, Chinese government leaders instituted more stringent controls especially on groups with foreign connections. China, of course, is not alone here as many other countries have also adopted “foreign agents” laws. This suspicion of foreign groups and funding complicates the relationship between state and civil society. However, Spires points out that the suspicions held by China are not accurate, and in fact “it may be more appropriate to view both funding flows and the thrust of foreign advice about civil society structures and regulation as well in tune with the Chinese party-state’s own political and social agenda, offering lip service to democratization and human rights yet doing little to challenge the status quo in any radical way”.
Thus, Spires argues, the real threat is not from global civil society supporting democratic revolutions in China but instead introducing the concept of “universal values” (pushi jiazhi 普世价值). Spires argues this is where global civil society has made a difference in China, introducing “key ideas supportive of universal values and providing legitimacy for Chinese civil society actors who seek to hold the Chinese state to account and to its own rhetorical aspirations to democracy and human rights”. Through interaction with global civil society, the concept of “universal values” has gained support in China, especially among a younger demographic.
Spires also examines the development of TANs (transnational activist networks) in addition to civil society organizations. Scholars argue that TANs offer three main things to domestic activists: information, ideas, and networks. Spires finds that TANs have served as important sources of new ideas, norms, and identities exerting significant impact within China. However, in information exchange and building networks, he finds that TANs have not been effective in China, and in fact, have catalyzed information and surveillance controls on civil society and activists. China developed strong technologies of control, and networking has made Chinese Civil Society Organisations and activists targets of state repression simply by virtue of their international connections. In fact, warnings against “colluding” with foreign forces were written into Hong Kong’s 2020 National Security Law, and harming “national security” written into China’s 2017 INGO Law.
This balance between benefiting from global civil society engagement while minimizing any impact from outside groups I have called “consultative authoritarianism”. This social management strategy has resulted in a crackdown on domestic civil society groups focused on human rights, the transformation of other groups into government service providers, and a comprehensive INGO Law requiring registration with the national police and hindering any collaborations between international and domestic groups.
However, despite the fragility of global civil society engagement within China, we observe interesting possibilities created by Beijing’s new “going out” policies for Chinese civil society groups. In 2013, Xi Jinping encouraged more exchanges between youth, think tanks, parliaments, NGOs and civil organizations, and in 2021, the Ministry of Civil Affairs issued the 14th Five-Year Plan for the Development of Social Organizations explaining that the Ministry will “steadily facilitate the ‘Going Out’ of domestic social organizations, carry out overseas cooperation in an orderly manner, enhance the ability of China’s social organizations in the participation of global governance, and improve the influence of Chinese culture and China’s ‘soft power’.” In this way, Chinese leaders view Chinese NGOs working in other countries as a vehicle for “soft power” initiatives to tell the “China story” and better communicate China’s messages to the world. However, promoting these NGOs internationally also allows Chinese leaders to promote a counter narrative to Western “universal values”. As Spires points out, Xi’s calls for NGOs to participate in “global governance” aligns with China’s efforts to reframe international human rights debates to emphasize social and economic rights over political and civil rights.
Spires accurately and elegantly explains why the future of global civil society in China does not look bright and suggests a promising new research direction of how Chinese NGOs engage with GCS outside of China. It will be interesting to see if Chinese NGOs adapt to local contexts as they work in other countries like INGOs did in China, or if they will create and promote a Chinese vision to replace the “universal values” of GCS internationally.
Main image: Shanghai Pudong International Airport. Credit: Victor Wong/Flickr. Book cover used with permission from the publisher.
