The recent wave of State recognition of Palestine operates as a diplomatic veneer, allowing States to claim alignment with human rights law while failing to meaningfully intervene or enforce it. This may mean that Palestinians are excluded from international statelessness protection regimes.
Key words: Palestine, statehood, sovereignty, statelessness, international law.
While the majority of the international community has long recognised Palestinian statehood, several Western States extended recognition only in 2024-2025. Although widely viewed as a move that is both morally and politically corrective of decades of injustice against Palestinians, these belated recognitions expose the asymmetrical politics of State recognition, in which Western endorsement is treated as conferring legitimacy despite decades of acknowledgment from the international community.
In diplomatic rhetoric, recognition was portrayed as reinforcing the centrality of international law, particularly the right of peoples to self-determination under the UN Charter. However, settler colonial violence, apartheid, systematic discrimination and dispossession, and ongoing atrocity crimes (war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide), particularly in the Gaza Strip carried on unabated, despite provisional measures being mandated by the International Court of Justice under the Genocide Convention.
Recognition without enforceable effect
These acts of recognition have not been consistently accompanied by corresponding foreign policy positions by the recognising States to uphold and give effect to the full body of international law as it pertains to the question of Palestine. In many instances, continued military, economic, and diplomatic support for Israel persists, in contravention of the provisional measures mandated by the International Court of Justice and despite grave breaches of international human rights and humanitarian law, violations of the prohibition on the acquisition of territory by force, and breaches of peremptory norms and international law principles.
This juxtaposition presents a paradox in which State recognition affirms Palestinian political existence at an abstract level, without changing any ground realities or obliging the recognising States to uphold the perpetrators of atrocity crimes to account. Despite State recognition, material conditions, including territorial control, institutional autonomy, and enforcement of fundamental human rights, remains constrained by structures widely critiqued by international legal scholars.
I argue that recognition, in the absence of effective sovereign authority, risks reducing a ‘formal’ legal status to legal ‘fiction’ that does not empower Palestinians to secure rights, enforce protections, or transform conditions of domination. Additionally, such recognition does not alter or challenge the colonial structures that dominate Palestinian life, govern access to land, and control mobility; and constrains the possibility of Palestinian self-determination and right of return.
To explore this tension, I situate recognition within five interconnected frameworks of international law.
International Law and the Doctrine of Statehood
Recognition of statehood in international law has traditionally been understood as declaratory rather than constitutive. Under Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933), often cited as reflecting customary criteria, an entity qualifies as a State if it has a permanent population, defined territory, government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other States. Recognition by other sovereign States does not, in theory, create statehood. Rather, it acknowledges a claim that already meets internationally recognised criteria.
However, doctrine and reality can diverge. While Palestinians constitute a permanent population with a distinct political identity, Palestinian territory remains contested, attacked, and fragmented. The colonial project of the creation of Israel on Palestinian territory was the first act of fragmentation, which has, over time, stripped away increasingly greater swathes of Palestinian territory, through innumerable violations of international law that continue today. The establishment of Israel was inextricably linked to the forced displacement and dispossession of Palestinians during the Nakba of 1948, through which hundreds of thousands were forcibly expelled from their homes and lands. The territories that are today recognised by States as constituting the ‘State of Palestine’—the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip—represent only a fraction of historic Palestine, explicitly excluding the vast areas colonised in 1948, from which Palestinians remain barred and forcibly displaced. The recognition of these fragments as ‘Palestine’ is itself problematic. It legitimises the territorial outcomes of mass dispossessions which were themselves gross violations of international law and entrenches a legal and political reality in which the majority of forcibly displaced Palestinians are excluded from the very definition of their homeland, further fragmenting Palestinian demography and collective identity across borders and in exile.
As a result, the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip are geographically and administratively separated, and their governance is heavily constrained by apartheid Israeli control regimes that regulate movement, security, land use, and borders. Even the nominally autonomous Palestinian Authority lacks control over borders, airspace, and key aspects of sovereignty. This constrains the very functions that underlie the exercise of effective government in situ, which is central to the doctrine of statehood.
Recognition by other States therefore acknowledges Palestinian claims only partially, insofar as it affirms political existence without altering the material capacity to exercise sovereign authority. This condition, what might be called juridical statehood without empirical sovereignty, reflects a broader structural tension in international law whereby the capacity of legal recognition is decoupled from political and territorial effectiveness. It prompts the question that if recognition does not change the conditions on the ground, what legal force, if at all, does it really have?
Settler colonialism as structural constraint
Settlement expansion into the Palestinian territories, the appropriation of land through ‘legal’ and administrative measures, and the establishment of an apartheid dual legal system applying separate laws to settlers and Palestinians are not random features of the Israeli presence; they are constitutive of settler colonial territorial control and demographic transformation.
Settler colonialism pursues permanent displacement and replacement of Indigenous populations, transforming both land and legal-political structures to ensure settler dominance. The recognition of Palestine as a ‘State’, while rhetorically affirming the political existence of Palestinians, does not inherently challenge or dismantle these colonial structures. In fact, by decoupling State recognition from enforceable sovereignty, the act of recognition legitimises a political fiction where Palestinians are ‘recognised’ without possessing the jurisdictional authority or territorial control to protect themselves, govern their land, or exercise their fundamental rights. The legal and symbolic affirmation of statehood, in such a context, may paradoxically stabilise the settler colonial order, embedding recognition within structures of domination rather than dismantling them.
International law prohibits the acquisition of territory by force and the transfer of an Occupying Power’s civilian population into occupied territory. The advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory reiterated the illegality of settlements and the associated regime of restrictions on Palestinian movement and property rights. Yet, settlement expansion has accelerated, accompanied by administrative measures that entrench settler control and fragment Palestinian territoriality.
Theoretical framing further illuminates the implications of recognition within a colonial matrix. Decolonial scholarship identifies international law as historically complicit in reproducing power asymmetries, privileging settler sovereignty over Indigenous rights. Recognition, when separated from effective sovereignty and territorial control, reinforces legal hierarchies in which the settler entity maintains structural dominance while Indigenous claims to self-determination are formally acknowledged but practically unenforceable. Recognition in isolation, therefore, does not disrupt settler colonial domination. Instead, it codifies asymmetrical power structures in international legal discourse. For instance, recent Israeli measures in the West Bank, approved in February 2026, illustrate the persistence of settler colonial authority. Recognition of Palestine as a ‘State’ has not curbed settler colonial expansion, deeper Israeli administrative control over Palestinian-governed areas, and erosion of the already limited jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority. This shows how State recognition has neither altered the underlying power asymmetry nor provided Palestinians with the legal tools to resist these incursions effectively.
Statelessness and the protection gap
For decades, many Palestinians were treated as stateless within the meaning of Article 1 of the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, which defines a stateless person as someone ‘who is not recognised as a national by any state under the operation of its law.’ While statelessness is a condition of acute vulnerability, the Convention establishes specific protection obligations. Protection frameworks have further institutionalised safeguards for stateless persons, particularly in asylum and migration regimes where formal legal status is determinative.
Nonetheless, with the recent wave of recognitions of Palestinian statehood, some States have begun to reclassify Palestinians as ‘nationals’ of the recognised but structurally non-sovereign State of Palestine. At first glance, this appears to transform exclusion into inclusion where stateless persons become nationals of a recognised State; however, it’s worth noting that the Palestinian Authority (PA) still has not formally adopted a nationality law. Therefore, Palestinian holders of PA issued documents cannot be recognised as ‘nationals’ under the operation of the ‘State’s’ law. The efficacy of nationality depends on the capacity and willingness of a State to exercise diplomatic protection, ensure consular assistance, and secure effective access to rights and protections. In the Palestinian context, nominal nationality does not translate into meaningful protection or enforceable remedies. Thus, reclassification as a ‘national’ may narrow access to protection procedures, humanitarian statuses, or residency pathways previously available to stateless persons.
This illustrates a broader structural bias in international law where there is a tendency to treat State-based nationality as inherently protective. Without sovereign capacity, nationality remains a formal label rather than a substantive guarantee of rights. In colonial and settler-colonial contexts, such assumptions obscure the material conditions required for self-determination to be meaningful.
The selective invocation of nationality to withdraw statelessness protections exemplifies how recognition can be deployed to narrow, rather than expand, avenues of protection. Each political choice about which legal consequences to activate, and which to ignore, reshapes the legal terrain in ways that may leave Palestinians significantly worse off. What emerges is a troubling picture of instrumentalised recognition where self-determination is affirmed symbolically while refusing to disrupt entrenched structures of legal and political hegemony. In such circumstances, recognition does not consolidate the international rule of law. Rather, it hollows it out, converting legal status into a formal label divorced from enforceable rights and reproducing the very inequalities that the doctrine of self-determination purports to redress.
Recognition in the context of ongoing atrocity crimes (war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide)
Recognition must also be evaluated in relation to ongoing violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law, particularly proceedings before the International Court of Justice considering violations by Israel of its obligations under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, as well as investigations by the International Criminal Court into whether individuals may bear responsibility for crimes against humanity and war crimes. Importantly, the Human Rights Council of the UNHCR has concluded the violence against Palestinians in Gaza in 2023 is genocide. It’s also worth noting that the International Association of Genocide Scholars released a statement that Israel’s policies and actions in Gaza meet the legal definition of genocide.
The international legal framework, particularly the Fourth Geneva Convention, imposes explicit obligations on the Occupying Power that prohibit forcible displacement, protects civilian populations, and administers territories in the interests of those affected. The 2024 provisional measures order of the International Court of Justice in relation to Gaza reaffirmed obligations under the Genocide Convention, including duties to prevent genocidal acts and facilitate humanitarian relief. Yet, despite recognition, Palestinians continue to experience severe violations of these obligations, including blockade and forced starvation, forced displacement, and denial of essential humanitarian aid, highlighting the gap between symbolic recognition and enforceable sovereignty.
State recognition, when divorced from enforceable mechanisms, functions as a diplomatic veneer that permits States to claim normative alignment with human rights principles while abstaining from intervention or enforcement. In the context of Palestine, such recognition provides Western powers with a convenient tool to appear supportive of the inalienable rights of Palestinians, without challenging the lived realities of Palestinians on the ground. When States recognise Palestinian statehood yet refuse to recalibrate military cooperation, suspend assistance linked to genocide and other atrocity crimes, or operationalise duties of non-assistance and accountability, recognition becomes an instrument of containment.
Recognition of Palestinian statehood has not generated enforceable mechanisms capable of preventing or remedying these violations. The doctrine of State responsibility provides that third States may have obligations of non-recognition and non-assistance in relation to serious breaches of peremptory norms. However, most recognitions have not been coupled with meaningful accountability measures such as arms embargoes, sanctions, or support for international legal inquiries.
Recognition in the context of the right to return
State recognition also operates as a harmful distraction in the context of the right of return for Palestinian refugees. Rooted in customary international law and U.N. resolutions, the Palestinian right of return is an inalienable right derived from historical dispossession and forced displacement. Yet, State recognition has neither facilitated nor reopened for discussion the return of displaced Palestinians, many of whom remain in protracted refugee conditions within and outside Historic Palestine. By focusing recognition on territorial claims to a hypothetical State rather than the rights of refugees, States subordinate the inalienable rights of forcibly displaced persons to diplomatic symbolism.
The right of return for Palestinian refugees is grounded in international legal instruments and affirmed in U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194 (III) (1948). The resolution expresses the principle that refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so and should receive compensation for their losses. Contemporary recognition discourse tends to focus on the territorial dimensions of Palestinian statehood within the West Bank and Gaza. While territorial claims are central to statehood, narrowing Palestinian rights to a territorial framework may marginalise the claims and the right to return of millions of refugees dispersed globally. Recognition focused narrowly on territory is likely to lead to subordinating refugee rights to diplomatic settlement models that prioritise geopolitical compromise over restitution and justice. This narrowing reflects a common pattern in international processes where refugee issues are treated as negotiable appendages to territorial agreements rather than as core rights issues.
Conclusion
Recognition of Palestinian statehood affirms the principle of self-determination and offers a formal acknowledgment of Palestinian political identity within the international legal order.
However, recognition alone does not alter material conditions. Where it is unaccompanied by enforceable sovereignty, structural transformation, and accountability, it becomes nothing more than a juridical abstraction.
More troublingly, recognition may, in certain configurations, produce regressive legal consequences. The reclassification of Palestinians from stateless persons to nominal nationals of a State lacking effective sovereign capacity highlights how formal inclusion can generate a protection vacuum. The withdrawal of statelessness-based protections narrows access to asylum regimes, documentation rights, and humanitarian safeguards. In such circumstances, recognition does not simply fail to enhance protection, it also recalibrates legal categories in ways that leave individuals exposed to more human rights violations.
Selective engagement with certain doctrines, such as self-determination and statehood, while refusing to operationalise others, including accountability and restitution, reveals recognition to be a political choice about which legal consequences to activate. When those choices consistently avoid material disruption of entrenched power asymmetries, recognition can function less as a vehicle of decolonisation and more as a mechanism of normalising colonisation.
For recognition to genuinely advance self-determination and rights, it must be embedded within a coherent and comprehensive commitment to international law in its entirety. That includes aligning foreign policy with duties of preserving territorial integrity, non-assistance, safeguarding refugee and statelessness protections, and pursuing accountability for international crimes. Without such integration, recognition becomes a gesture that affirms rights in principle while tolerating their systematic erosion in practice. It merely serves to reproduce the very hierarchies it purports to transcend, offering the language of sovereignty while leaving intact the conditions of dispossession and oppression.
Image: Two people on a horse and cart drive past destroyed buildings in Gaza, 2025. Photo by Mohammed Ibrahim on Unsplash.
