The year of daring: revisiting the Philippine left’s dalliance with a strongman

During the period from June 2016 (when Duterte was inaugurated) to August 2020, 328 anti-government activists have been killed, according to human rights group Karapatan. The latest killings in this record were often carried out by unidentified perpetrators, suspected by Karapatan of being linked to state forces. The difficulty of identifying the perpetrators makes it challenging to claim justice for these killings. Over the past year, state security forces have become more brazen, in full view of the public, in raiding the offices of legal activist organisations. Many Manila-based activists have been falsely identified as communist rebels (a process known as ‘redtagging’), and have been included on a terrorist list, which can have fatal consequences. In 2019, the Philippines was classified as the worst country in Asia for environmental defenders with 43 killings, according to Global Witness. Amid the COVID-19 pandemic, Duterte signed an anti-terror law that critics warn can allow most forms of political dissent to be sanctioned.

But this was not the case approximately five years ago.
From 2016 to 2017, the Duterte administration and the militant left movement established friendly relations in pursuit of progressive reforms and an end to decades-long armed conflict with communists. This sort of engagement between Philippine governments and progressive groups is not new and has been the subject of considerable scholarly attention. But the brief informal alliance between the Duterte administration and the militant left movement is important to examine because those involved are different from the past: the progressive group is more militant and the government has more authoritarian features.
After the downfall of the dictator Ferdinand Marcos Sr. in 1986, social democratic groups engaged with subsequent governments in an effort to transform politics. However, they largely ended up compromising heavily on government policies and becoming part of the electoral machineries of non-progressive politicians. Engagement with the Duterte administration, however, has involved a government espousing anti-human rights rhetoric and militant left groups that seek more radical socio-economic reforms.
Foremost among these groups are Bayan, a coalition of leftist organisations, and Makabayan, the leftist bloc in parliament. These two groups are organisationally distinct but ideologically aligned to underground groups such as the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), the New Peoples' Army (CPP's armed wing), and the National Democratic Front of the Philippines (CPP's political wing). Together they mobilised with the aim of transforming Philippine society into a 'national democracy', which is an extensive reform program based on revolutionary land reform and nationalised industries.
Contrary to the view that the left was subordinated to Duterte to give his 'fascist' rule a 'left gloss', we found that the left used a dual strategy vis-a-vis Duterte, or what we also call here a 'friend-and-foe' strategy. The left tried to maintain its cooperation with Duterte in hopes of advancing progressive policies and programs. At the same time, it opposed the Duterte administration's authoritarian tendencies, especially its anti-human rights rhetoric and actions.
In a recently published journal article, we explain the conditions for the emergence of the Duterte-left relationship, its challenges, and the tipping points that led to its collapse. We present a short version of the findings in this piece.

Emergence of the left-Duterte relationship
How was an alliance possible between Duterte and a left movement that saw itself as Because of the militant left's human rights work, it was expected to be a staunch critic of Duterte's 'War on Drugs' and to use its resources to help victims and their families. However, unlike the families of counterinsurgency victims who were more likely to be political and speak out, victims in the 'War on Drugs' came mainly from poor, apolitical families who were unlikely to make any sort of complaint. Compared to counterinsurgency killings, drug-related ones are of a different order of magnitude and documenting them would stretch any organisation's capabilities.
These factors undoubtedly contributed to slowing down the response on the part of oppositional position.

Friend and foe: a dual strategy
In the early days of the alliance, some observers noted that the left's appetite for critique, particularly its advocacy of human rights against the drug war, was dampened by appointments in the administration. It is true that the left took no interest in street protests in the early months of the Duterte administration and some leaders of the left initially defended Duterte from allegations of drug-related extrajudicial killings. Expressions of opposition to the War on Drugs nevertheless did emerge at the very beginning of Duterte's term. On July 1, 2016 the CPP supported the campaign against illegal drugs, but called for due process in anti-drug operations. However, by August 12, the CPP already condemned the drug war as The presence of militant left leaders in government and in the pro-administration super-majority coalition in Congress could have given them access to resources and opportunities to push for reforms. But unlike social democrats in previous administrations who were rewarded with limited access to resources, attempts by the militant left at reform using their alliance with Duterte met with less hospitality from traditional politicians, big business, and the military. For example, they were unable to influence the conduct of the drug war. As for the peace talks, these too were subject to uncertainty. As Duterte increasingly pivoted towards a military approach to the revolutionary left, the militant left in government and Congress could only plead with him for more patience with the peace negotiations. The situation changed in November 2016.

Tipping point: resuming radical opposition to authoritarianism
The event that decisively broke the friend-and-foe relationship between the left and The militant lawmakers said they had initially supported Duterte for his progressive promises, but that the administration had unravelled into a 'fascist, pro-imperialist and anti-people regime', as Duterte halted the peace talks, declared martial law in Mindanao, and pursued a foreign policy dependent on China. 'Worst of all, his 'war on drugs' has turned into a campaign of mass murder of the poor', claimed Makabayan, with no indication of turning back.

A full breakdown of the alliance
It is an exaggeration to argue that Duterte simply subordinated the left as a political force. The left continued contentious actions against neoliberal economic policies and tested the boundaries of the alliance in attempts to actualise Duterte's promises of progressive reforms. But given the widening disparity between Duterte's promises and actions, the left's strategy of cooperation and contention could not last. The War on Drugs continues to result in the deaths in the tens of thousands and has defined the regime. The left may have been overly optimistic about Duterte's capacity to deliver on his promises on social and economic reforms. In light of Duterte's clear failure to deliver on reforms, it simply became untenable for the left to justify its high-level association with his government. The Marcos burial issue was the last straw.
Since the breakdown of the alliance, leftist human rights advocates have expanded their work to champion victims of the 'War on Drugs'. This is evident in their role in organising families of victims of drug-related killings, who, under the banner of 'Rise Up for Rights and for Life', filed a communication in August 2018 with the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. Leftists are also instrumental in mobilising lawyers and paralegals who represent many of these families' demands for justice.
Taking a broader view of the history of progressive engagements with post-Marcos administrations, the failure of the left-Duterte alliance also underscores and confirms the extreme difficulty of pursuing reform of and within the Philippines' elite democracy. For the militant left, an alliance with Duterte represented a possible opportunity to achieve substantial concessions from elite classes through peace negotiations and high-level policymaking. In hindsight, its calculations may have been overly optimistic, having failed to take into account Duterte's own need for bases of power in the military and police as he battled other elite families and established himself as the nation's strongman.
As the Philippines lurches even more clearly towards authoritarianism, radical opposition, not progressive cooperation, is becoming more imperative.